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transfers. Part I analyzes how case law interprets indirect value received in exchange for a 
debtor’s transfers. Part II examines how case law interprets intangible value received in 
exchange for a debtor’s transfers. Part III addresses the current split in case law regarding 
whether a trustee for a debtor parent may avoid college tuition payments made on behalf of the 
debtor’s children, as fraudulent transfers. 
I. Indirect Value May Provide Reasonably Equivalent Value  
 
Under section 548(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code “‘value’ means property, or satisfaction 
or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor but does not include an unperformed 
promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor.”5 Although the statute 
defines “value,” both the statute and the legislative history fail to define “reasonably equivalent 
value.”6 When analyzing whether a debtor received value, “[c]ourts generally construe the term 
‘value’ broadly for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”7  
When analyzing whether a debtor received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for a 
transfer, a court will evaluate whether (1) the debtor received value, and (2) the value received 
was reasonably equivalent to the value transferred.8 After a defendant establishes that the debtor 
has indeed received value, the burden shifts to the trustee to show that the debtor did not receive 
reasonably equivalent value.9 In analyzing whether a debtor received “reasonably equivalent 
value,” courts have used a broad interpretation.10  
 
5 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(a) (2018). 
6 See Andrew Mackenzie, The Tuition “Claw Back” Phenomenon: Reasonably Equivalent Value and Parental 
Tuition Payments, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 924, 931 (2016). 
7 In re PSN USA, Inc., 615 F. App'x 925, 930 (11th Cir. 2015).  
8 See In re Miami Neurological Inst., 2020 WL 3410182, at *4. 
9 See id. at *6. 
10 See id. at *7 (holding tuition payments made by a debtor on behalf of debtor’s employees gave debtor “reasonably 
equivalent value”).  
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Courts have generally held value received by a debtor indirectly, where the initial benefit 
has gone to a third person, can provide reasonably equivalent value under section 548.11  
The seminal case on the matter is Rubin v. Hanover Mfr. Trust. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 
1981).12 In Rubin v. Hanover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a 
debtor could have received value indirectly through the ability to settle its accounts quicker 
thereby increasing available funds, and by receiving a source of working capital to keep the 
debtor in business in exchange for loans made by the debtor to third parties.13 The Second 
Circuit remanded and directed the lower court to consider the monetary value of these exchanges 
but noted when calculating value received versus value transferred, the court need not require “a 
penny-for-penny exchange.”14 The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
followed the indirect benefit rule established by Rubin but narrowed the applicability to only 
situations where the value received was (1) an economic benefit, (2) that was concrete, and (3) 
quantifiable.15  
II. Intangible Benefits May Provide Reasonably Equivalent Value  
 
Courts have frequently held that “[e]ven intangible property can confer value on a 
debtor.”16 In one case, a court held that educational benefits received by debtor’s employees 
conferred intangible value to debtor when said employees used that knowledge to implement 
 
11 See In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Grp., 956 F.2d 479, 485 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that reasonably 
equivalent value can come from one other than the recipient of the payments, a rule which has become known as the 
indirect benefit rule.”); In re PSN USA, Inc., 615 F. App'x at 933 (holding debtor received reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for $3 million in payments made under a contract between debtor’s parent company and a third 
party satellite service, to which debtor was not a party, because debtor received satellite services under the contract 
and indirectly benefitted from any benefit to the parent company). 
12 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981). 
13 Id. at 993–94. 
14 Id. at 994. 
15 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444, 457–59 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (holding “speculative and unquantifiable 
claims of psychological benefits,” received by debtor parents in exchange for paying their son’s college tuition, did 
not provide reasonably equivalent value). 
16 See In re Miami Neurological Inst., No. 17-10703-BKC-RAM, 2020 WL 3410182, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 
19, 2020). 
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better operational strategies by negotiating for better insurance rates and decreasing collection 
times on accounts receivable.17 Another court held debtors received reasonably equivalent value 
not only through cash received, but through the value in a repurchase option and the debtors’ 
ability to continue to run debtors’ business.18 Courts have even held promises to provide future 
services to be intangible, reasonably equivalent value transfers, that had an ascertainable 
economic benefit.19  
III. There is a Split in Case Law on Whether Debtor Parents Receive Indirect, Intangible 
Value in Exchange for Paying their Children’s College Tuition  
There is currently a split in case law on the issue of whether college tuition payments 
made by a debtor parent on behalf of their children are avoidable under section 548(d)(2)(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code.20 The source behind the different conclusions on the same issue, starts 
with which circumstances of the issue the court focuses on and how broadly the court interprets 
the language of section 548.21  
A. A Debtor Parent Receives Indirect, Intangible Value in Exchange for Paying Their 
Children’s College Tuition  
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held payments made by 
debtor parents for undergraduate tuition were not avoidable as fraudulent transfers under section 
548 because they provided reasonably equivalent value in an indirect, intangible form.22 There, 
the court disregarded a precedent that held “parents are not responsible for the educational 
support of their children past high school,” and stated “[w]hile the Pennsylvania legislature has 
 
17 Id. at *5. 
18 In re Calvillo, 263 B.R. 214, 220 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
19 See In re Pawlak, 483 B.R. 169, 185 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012) (holding promise to provide future legal services 
provided reasonably equivalent value).  
20 See Derek A. Huish, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking to Ancient and Recent History to 
Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2182 (2019). 
21 See id. 
22 In re Cohen, No. ADV 07-02517-JAD, 2012 WL 5360956, at *10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2012), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part on other grounds, remanded sub nom, Cohen v. Sikirica, 487 B.R. 615 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
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not yet enacted a statute that requires parents to pay for their children’s post-secondary education 
. . . such expenses are reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the Debtor’s family . . . ” 
thus, taking a very broad view of “intangible.”23 Identically, a year later, the same court denied a 
trustee’s request to avoid tuition payments, holding payments made by debtor parents for their 
children’s undergraduate tuition were a “necessity” even though there was not a legal obligation 
for parents to pay their children’s undergraduate tuition.24 The court acknowledged an intangible, 
“societal expectation” that obligates parents to do so.25 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held such transfers were not avoidable because they are 
“reasonable and necessary expense[s] for maintenance of the family and for preparing family 
members for the future,” thus, taking another broad view that tuition coverage indirectly 
conveyed intangible, reasonably equivalent value to the debtor parent.26  
In 2018, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York created a split on 
the issue within their own district by holding such transfers were not avoidable. The bankruptcy 
court reasoned that in exchange for the tuition payments made for the benefit of debtors’ 
children, debtors indirectly received reasonably equivalent value through means of satisfaction of 
an intangible, societal obligation to fund their children’s college education.27 However, the 
Sterman court drew a line defining this broad view, holding the transfers made for the benefit of 
the debtors’ children after they turned twenty-one, when they were becoming financially 
independent, were avoidable under section 548.28  
B. A Debtor Parent Does Not Receive Indirect, Intangible Value in Exchange for Paying 
Their Children’s College Tuition  
 
 
23 Id. at *9–10. 
24 In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013). 
25 Id. 
26 In re Lewis, 574 B.R. 536, 541 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2017).  
27 In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 238–39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
28 Id. at 239. 
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The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held tuition payments made 
by debtor parents for their eighteen-year-old son were avoidable as fraudulent transfers.29 It was 
argued that debtors indirectly received the intangible benefits of peace of mind in anticipation 
that their son would not need their financial support in the future, after he received an 
education.30 The court noted the Bankruptcy Code does not define “reasonably equivalent value” 
and proceeded to analyze precedent following the indirect benefit rule that was established by 
Rubin but interpreted it narrowly, holding any indirect benefit flowing to debtor had to be (1) an 
economic benefit, (2) that was concrete, and (3) that was quantifiable.31 The court reasoned 
satisfactions of moral obligations do not bestow any concrete, economic value on debtors, 
especially since there is no legal obligation to support adult children, and higher education does 
not necessarily guarantee financial success for the child.32 Specifically, the court stated 
“[s]peculative and unquantifiable claims of psychological benefits cannot meet Marquette’s [the 
fraudulent transferee’s] burden.”33  
In In re Lindsay, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held tuition 
payments made by debtor parent were avoidable as fraudulent transfers and actually ordered the 
debtor to personally pay back the trustee.34 Similar to In re Leonard, the Lindsey court reasoned 
that there was no law requiring parents to pay for their children’s college education and 
highlighted the lack of precedent to support the debtor’s argument that satisfaction of an 
intangible, moral obligation is a defense to section 548.35  
 
29 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011). 
30 Id. at 454–55. 
31 See id. at 456–57. 
32 Id. at 457. 
33 Id. at 459.   
34 No. 06-36352 (CGM), 2010 WL 1780065, at *9–10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010). 
35 See id. 
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The First Circuit overruled the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court’s decision that college 
tuition payments made on behalf of debtors’ child were not avoidable because they contributed 
to future self-sufficiency of the child.36 The lower court had held college tuition payments made 
on behalf of debtors’ child were not avoidable because they contributed to future self-sufficiency 
of the child which was “concrete and quantifiable enough.”37 In overruling the lower court, 
similarly, to the above case law focusing on concrete, economic, quantifiable value, the First 
Circuit held none of the five recognized classes of transactions that confer value were present: 
(1) the exchange of property; (2) the satisfaction of a present debt; (3) the satisfaction of an 
antecedent debt; (4) the securing or collateralizing of a present debt; and (5) the granting of 
security for the purpose of securing an antecedent debt, and there was no legal obligation to pay 
a child’s college tuition, thus providing debtor parents with no reasonably equivalent value.38  
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut also held such payments were 
avoidable under section 548.39 The court acknowledged “concerns about familial obligations,” 
but referred to the intent of Congress in holding such transfers to be avoidable.40 Specifically, the 
court stated “it is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered 
its stance” based on the issue in this case.41 The court also stated that although “such support 
[was] unquestionably admirable,” there was no legal obligation to pay for debtor’s child’s 
college education, thus the transfer did not give debtor reasonably equivalent value.42  
 
36 In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). 
37 In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016), rev'd and remanded, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). 
38 In re Palladino, 942 F.3d at 59.  
39 In re Knight, No. 15-21646 (JJT), 2017 WL 4410455, at *7 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2017). 
40 Id. at *4. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at *5. 
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Likewise, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia held such tuition 
payments to be avoidable under section 548.43 The Georgia bankruptcy court acknowledged that 
“the debtor may have felt a moral obligation to pay for [their child’s] college education and help 
her to achieve financial independence,” but held the satisfaction of such intangible, moral 
obligations did not provide the debtor parent with reasonably equivalent value.44 The debtor did 
not receive any form of economic benefit; they did not discharge or satisfy any legal obligations, 
nor did they increase their assets in any way.45  
 In comparison, when analyzing the issue in another context, a court recently held a debtor 
indirectly received reasonably equivalent value when the debtor paid its employees’ tuition and 
an employee used the knowledge gained to negotiate better insurance rates and decrease 
collection times on accounts receivable for the debtor.46 Although the court did not explicitly 
state that value received had to be economic, concrete, and quantifiable, the court did go through 
an analysis to determine whether the value received roughly equaled the value transferred.47 
Currently, this is the only case that has addressed the issue in the employer-employee context. 
Conclusion  
There are two starkly different approaches that courts take when it comes to deciding 
whether a debtor parent receives reasonably equivalent value in exchange for paying their child’s 
college tuition. Courts seemingly agree that value may include an indirect benefit but appear to 
disagree on the breadth of latitude with which they interpret “intangible benefits.”48 Courts 
 
43 See Matter of Dunston, 566 B.R. 624, 637 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2017). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 In re Miami Neurological Inst., No. 17-10703-BKC-RAM, 2020 WL 3410182, at *7 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 19, 
2020). 
47 Id. at *5. 
48 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444, 457 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 238 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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holding debtor parents do not receive reasonably equivalent value focus on whether parents 
received “concrete, economic, and quantifiable” value which is a more traditional view of the 
definition of “value” within the Bankruptcy Code.49 In contrast, courts holding debtor parents 
receive reasonably equivalent value focus on a broad interpretation of intangible benefits such as 
satisfaction of “societal obligations” and “necessities” to “maintain the family.”50  
 
 
49 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 459; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016), rev'd and 
remanded, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). 
50 See In re Sterman, 594 B.R. at 238; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013). 
